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JUSTICE SCALIA'S MISUNDERSTANDING* 
Stephen Jay Gould** 
Charles Lyell, defending both his version of geology and his 
designation of James Hutton as its intellectual father, described 
Richard Kirwan as a man "who possessed much greater authority 
in the scientific world than he was entitled by his talents to enjoy." 
Kirwan, chemist, mineralogist, and president of the Royal 
Academy of Dublin, did not incur Lyell's wrath for a mere scientific 
disagreement, but for saddling Hutton with the most serious indict-
ment of all-atheism and impiety. Kirwan based his accusations on 
the unlikely charge that Hutton had placed the earth's origin be-
yond the domain of what science could consider or (in a stronger 
claim) had even denied that a point of origin could be inferred at all. 
Kirwan wrote in 1799: 
Recent experience has shown that the obscurity in which the philosophical knowl· 
edge of this [original] state has hitherto been involved, has proved too favorable to 
the structure of various systems of atheism or infidelity, as these have been in their 
turn to turbulence and immorality, not to endeavor to dispel it by all the lights 
which modern geological researches have struck out. Thus it will be found that 
geology naturally ripens ... into religion, as this does into morality. 
In our more secular age, we may fail to grasp the incendiary 
character of such a charge at the end of the eighteenth century, 
when intellectual respectability in Britain absolutely demanded an 
affirmation of religious fealty, and when fear of spreading revolution 
from France and America equated any departure from orthodoxy 
with encouragement of social anarchy. Calling someone an atheist 
in those best and worst of all times invited the same predictable 
reaction as asking Cyrano how many sparrows had perched up 
there or standing up in a Boston bar and announcing that DiMag-
gio was a better hitter than Williams. 
Thus, Hutton's champions leaped to his defense, first his con-
temporary and Boswell, John Playfair, who wrote (in 1802) that 
such poisoned weapons as he [Kirwan] was preparing to use, are hardly ever allow-
able in scientific contest, as having a less direct tendency to overthrow the system, 
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than to hurt the person of an adversary, and to wound, perhaps incurably, his mind, 
his reputation, or his peace. 
Thirty years later, Charles Lyell was still fuming: 
We cannot estimate the malevolence of such a persecution, by the pain which simi-
lar insinuations might now inflict; for although charges of infidelity and atheism 
must always be odious, they were injurious in the extreme at that moment of polit-
ical excitement [Principles of Geology, 1830]. 
(Indeed, Kirwan noted that his book had been ready for the 
printers in 1798 but had been delayed for a year by "the confusion 
arising from the rebellion then raging in Ireland"-the great Irish 
peasant revolt of 1798, squelched by Viscount Castlereagh, uncle of 
Darwin's Captain FitzRoy.) 
Kirwan's accusation centered upon the last sentence of Hut-
ton's Theory of the Earth (original version of 1788)-the most fa-
mous words ever written by a geologist (quoted in all textbooks, and 
often emblazoned on the coffee mugs and T -shirts of my 
colleagues). 
The result, therefore, of our present enquiry is, that we find no vestige of a begin-
ning-no prospect of an end. 
Kirwan interpreted both this motto, and Hutton's entire argu-
ment, as a claim for the earth's eternity (or at least as a statement of 
necessary agnosticism about the nature of its origin). But if the 
earth be eternal, then God did not make it. And if we need no God 
to fashion our planet, then do we need him at all? Even the weaker 
version of Hutton as agnostic about the earth's origin supported a 
charge of atheism in Kirwan's view-for if we cannot know that 
God made the earth at a certain time, then biblical authority is de-
throned, and we must wallow in uncertainty about the one matter 
that demands our total confidence. 
It is, I suppose, a testimony to human carelessness and to our 
tendency to substitute quips for analysis that so many key phrases, 
the mottoes of our social mythology, have standard interpretations 
quite contrary to their intended meanings. Kirwan's reading has 
prevailed. Most geologists still think that Hutton was advocating 
an earth of unlimited duration-though we now view such a claim 
as heroic rather than impious. 
Yet Kirwan's charge was more than merely vicious-it was 
dead wrong. Moreover, in understanding why Kirwan erred (and 
why we still do), and in recovering what Hutton really meant, we 
illustrate perhaps the most important principle that we can state 
about science as a way of knowing. Our failure to grasp the princi-
ple underlies much public misperception about science. In particu-
1988] EVOLUTION 3 
lar, Justice Scalia's recent dissent in the Louisiana "creation 
science" case rests upon this error when it discusses the character of 
evolutionary arguments. We all rejoiced when the Supreme Court 
ended a long episode in American history and voided the last law 
that would have forced teachers to "balance" instruction in evolu-
tion with fundamentalist biblical literalism masquerading under the 
oxymoron creation science. I now add a tiny hurrah in postscript 
by pointing out that the dissenting argument rests, in large part, 
upon a misunderstanding of science. 
Hutton replied to Kirwan's original attack by expanding his 
1788 treatise into a cumbersome work, The Theory of the Earth 
(1795). With its forty-page quotations in French and its repetitive, 
involuted justifications, Hutton's new work condemned his theory 
to unreadability. Fortunately, his friend John Playfair, a mathema-
tician and outstanding prose stylist, composed the most elegant 
pony ever written and published his Illustrations of the Huttonian 
Theory of the Earth in 1802. Playfair presents a two-part refutation 
for Kirwan's charge of atheism. 
1. Hutton neither argued that the earth was eternal nor even 
claimed that we could say nothing about its origin. In his greatest 
contribution, Hutton tried to develop a cyclical theory for the his-
tory of the earth's surface, a notion to match the Newtonian vision 
of continuous planetary revolution about the sun. The materials of 
the earth's surface, he argued, passed through a cycle of perfect rep-
etition in the large. Consider the three major stages. First, moun-
tains erode and their products are accumulated as thick sequences 
of layered sediments in the ocean. Second, sediments consolidate 
and their weight melts the lower layers, forming magmas. Third, 
the pressure of these magmas forces the sediments up to form new 
mountains (with solidified magmas at their core), while the old, 
eroded continents become new ocean basins. The cycle then starts 
again as mountains (at the site of old oceans) shed their sediments 
into ocean basis (at the site of old continents). Land and sea change 
positions in an endless dance, but the earth itself remains funda-
mentally the same. Playfair writes: 
It is the peculiar excellence of this theory ... that it makes the decay of one part 
subservient to the restoration of another, and gives stability to the whole, not by 
perpetuating individuals, but by reproducing them in succession. 
We can easily grasp the revolutionary nature of this theory for 
concepts of time. Most previous geologies had envisioned an earth 
of short duration, moving in a single irreversible direction, as its 
original mountains eroded into the sea. By supplying a "concept of 
repair" in his view of magmas as uplifing forces, Hutton burst the 
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strictures of time. No more did continents erode once into oblivion; 
they could form anew from the products of their own decay and the 
earth could cycle on and on. 
This cyclical theory has engendered the false view that Hutton 
considered the earth eternal. True, the mechanics of the cycle pro-
vide no insight into beginnings or ends, for laws of the cycle can 
only produce a continuous repetition and therefore contain no no-
tion of birth, death, or even of aging. But this conclusion only spec-
ifies that laws of the present order of nature cannot specify 
beginnings or ends. Beginnings and ends may exist-in fact, Hut-
ton considered a concept of starts and stops absolutely essential for 
any rational understanding-but we cannot learn anything about 
this vital subject from nature's present laws. Hutton, who was a 
devoted theist despite Kirwan's charge, argued that God had made 
a beginning, and would ordain an end, by summoning forces outside 
the current order of nature. For the stable period between, he had 
ordained laws that impart no directionality and therefore permit no 
insight into these beginnings and ends. 
Note how carefully Hutton chose the words of his celebrated 
motto. "No vestige of a beginning" because the earth has been 
through so many cycles since then that all traces of its original state 
have vanished. But an original state it certainly had. "No prospect 
of an end" because the current laws of nature provide no insight 
into a termination that must surely occur. Playfair describes Hut-
ton's view of God: 
He may put an end, as he no doubt gave a beginning, to the present system, at some 
determinate period; but we may safely conclude, that this great catastrophe will not 
be brought about by any of the laws now existing, and that it is not indicated by any 
thing which we perceive. 
2. Hutton did not view our inability to specify beginnings and 
ends as a baleful limitation of science but as a powerful affirmation 
of proper scientific methodology. Let theory deal with ultimate ori-
gins, and let science be the art of the empirically soluble. 
The British tradition of speculative geology-from Burnet, 
Whiston, and Woodward in the late seventeenth century to Kirwan 
himself at the tail end of the eighteenth-had focused upon recon-
structions of the earth's origin, primarily to justify the Mosaic nar-
rative as scientifically plausible. Hutton argued that such attempts 
could not qualify as proper science, for they could only produce 
speculations about a distant past devoid of evidence to test any as-
sertion (no vestige of a beginning). The subject of origins may be 
vital and fascinating, far more compelling than the humdrum of 
quotidian forces that drive the present cycle of uplift, erosion, depo-
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sition, and consolidation. But science is not speculation about unat-
tainable ultimates; it is a way of knowing based upon laws now in 
operation and results subject to observation and inference. We ac-
knowledge limits in order to proceed with power and confidence. 
Hutton therefore attacked the old tradition of speculation 
about the earth's origin as an exercise in futile unprovability. Better 
to focus upon what we can know and test, leaving aside what the 
methods of science cannot touch, however fascinating the subject. 
Playfair stresses this theme more forcefully (and more often) than 
any other in his exposition of Hutton's theory. He regards Hutton's 
treatise as, above all, an elegant statement of proper scientific meth-
odology-and he locates Hutton's wisdom primarily in his friend's 
decision to eschew the subject of ultimate origins and to focus on 
the earth's present operation. Playfair begins by criticizing the old 
manner of theorizing: 
The sole object of such theories has hitherto been, to explain the manner in which 
the present laws of the mineral kingdom were first established, or began to exist, 
without treating of the manner in which they now proceed. 
He then evaluates this puerile strategy in one of his best prose 
flourishes: 
The absurdity of such an undertaking admits of no apology; and the smile which it 
might excite, if addressed merely to the fancy, gives place to indignation when it 
assumes the air of philosophic investigation. 
Hutton, on the other hand, established the basis of a proper 
geological science by avoiding subjects "altogether beyond the lim-
its of philosophical investigation." Hutton's explorations "never 
extended to the first origin of substances, but were confined entirely 
to their changes." Playfair elaborated: 
He has indeed no where treated of the first origin of any of the earths, or of any 
substance whatsoever, but only of the transformations which bodies have undergone 
since the present laws of nature were established. He considered this last as all that 
a science, built on experiment and observation, can possibly extend to; and willingly 
left, to more presumptuous inquirers, the task of carrying their reasonings beyond 
the boundaries of nature. 
Finally, to Kirwan's charge that Hutton had limited science by 
his "evasion" of origins, Playfair responded that his friend had 
strengthened science by his positive program of studying what 
could be resolved: 
Instead of an evasion, therefore, any one who considers the subject fairly, will see, in 
Dr. Hutton's reasoning, nothing but the caution of a philosopher, who wisely con-
fines his theory within the same limits by which nature has confined his experience 
and observation. 
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This all happened a long time ago and in a context foreign to 
our concerns. But Hutton's methodological wisdom, and Playfair's 
eloquent warning, could not be more relevant today-for basic prin-
ciples of empirical science do have an underlying generality that can 
transcend time. Practicing scientists have largely (but not always) 
imbibed Hutton's wisdom about restricting inquiry to questions 
that can be answered. But Kirwan's error of equating the best in 
science with the biggest questions about ultimate things continues 
to be the most common of popular misunderstandings. 
I have often mentioned that fifteen years of monthly columns 
have brought me an enormous correspondence from nonprofession-
als about all aspects of science. From sheer volume, I obtain a 
pretty good sense of strengths and weaknesses in public perceptions. 
I have found that one common misconception surpasses all others. 
People will write, telling me that they have developed a revolution-
ary theory, one that will expand the boundaries of science. These 
theories, usually described in several pages of single-spaced type-
script, are speculations about the deepest ultimate questions we can 
ask-what is the nature of life? the origin of the universe? the begin-
ning of time? 
But thoughts are cheap. Any person of intelligence can devise 
his half dozen before breakfast. Scientists can also spin out ideas 
about ultimates. We don't (or, rather, we confine them to our pri-
vate thoughts) because we cannot devise ways to test them, to de-
cide whether they are right or wrong. What good to science is a 
lovely idea that cannot, as a matter of principle, ever be affirmed or 
denied? 
The following homily may seem paradoxical but it embodies 
Hutton's wisdom: the best science often proceeds by putting aside 
the overarching generality and focusing instead on a smaller ques-
tion that can be reliably answered. In so doing, scientists show their 
intuitive feel for the fruitful, not their narrowness or paltriness of 
spirit. In this way we sneak up on big questions that only repel us if 
we try to engulf them in one fell speculation. Newton could not 
discover the nature of gravity, but he could devise a mathematics 
that unified the motion of a carriage with the revolution of the 
moon. Darwin never tried to grasp the meaning of life (or even the 
manner of its origin on our planet), but he did develop a powerful 
theory to explain its manner of change through time. Hutton did 
not discover how our earth originated, but he developed some pow-
erful and testable ideas about how it ticked. You might almost de-
fine a good scientist as a person with the horse sense to discern the 
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largest answerable question-and to shun useless issues that sound 
bigger. 
Hutton's positive principle of restriction to the doable also de-
fines the domain and procedures of evolutionary biology, my own 
discipline. Evolution is not the study of life's ultimate origin as a 
path toward discerning its deepest meaning. Evolution, in fact, is 
not the study of origins at all. Even the more restricted (and scien-
tifically permissible) question of life's origin on our earth lies 
outside its domain. (This interesting problem, I suspect, falls pri-
marily within the purview of chemistry and the physics of self-or-
ganizing systems.) Evolution studies the pathways and mechanisms 
of organic change following the origin of life. Not exactly a shabby 
subject either-what with such resolvable questions as "how, when, 
and where did humans evolve?"; how do mass extinction, continen-
tal drift, competition among species, climatic change, and inherited 
constraints of form and development interact to influence the man-
ner and rate of evolutionary change?"; "how do the branches of 
life's tree fit together?" to mention just a few among thousands 
equally exciting. 
In their recently aborted struggle to inject Genesis literalism 
into science classrooms, fundamentalist groups followed their usual 
opportunistic strategy of arguing two contradictory sides of a ques-
tion when a supposed rhetorical advantage could be extracted from 
each. Their main pseudoargument held that Genesis literalism is 
not religion at all, but really an alternative form of science (creation 
science) not acknowledged by professional biologists too hidebound 
and dogmatic to appreciate the cutting edge of their own discipline. 
When we successfully pointed out that creation science-as an un-
testable set of dogmatic proposals--could not qualify as science by 
any standard definition, they turned around and shamelessly argued 
the other side. (They actually pulled off the neater trick of holding 
both positions simultaneously.) Now they argued that, yes indeed, 
creation science is religion, but evolution is equally religious. 
To support this dubious claim, they tumbled (as a conscious 
trick of rhetoric, I suspect) right into Kirwan's error. They ignored 
what evolutionists actually do and misrepresented our science as the 
study of life's ultimate origin. They then pointed out, as Hutton 
had, that question of ultimate origins are not resolvable by science. 
Thus, they claimed, creation science and evolution science are sym-
metrical-that is, equally religious. Creation science isn't science 
because it rests upon the untestable fashioning of life ex nihilo by 
God. Evolution science isn't science because it tries, as its major 
aim, to resolve the unresolvable and ultimate origin of life. But we 
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do no such thing. We understand Hutton's wisdom-"he has no-
where treated of the first origin ... of any substance ... but only of 
the transformations which bodies have undergone .... " 
Our legal battle with creationists started in the 1920s and 
reached an early climax with the conviction of John Scopes in 1925. 
After some quiescence, it began in earnest again during the 1970s 
and has haunted us ever since. (I have written more than half a 
dozen essays, most in this series, on the resurgence of creation sci-
ence.) Finally, in June 1987, the Supreme Court ended this major 
chapter in American history with a decisive 7-2 vote, striking down 
the last creationist statute, the Louisiana equal time act, as a ruse to 
inject religion into science classrooms in violation of first amend-
ment guarantees for separation of church and state. 
I don't mean to appear ungrateful, but we fallible humans are 
always seeking perfection in others. I couldn't help wondering how 
two justices could have ruled the other way. I may not be politi-
cally astute, but I am not totally naive either. I have read Justice 
Scalia's long dissent carefully, and I recognize that its main thrust 
lies in legal issues supporting the extreme judicial conservatism es-
poused by Scalia and the other dissenter, Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Nonetheless, though it may form only part of his rationale, Scalia's 
argument relies crucially upon a false concept of science-Kirwan's 
error again. I regret to say that Justice Scalia does not understand 
the subject matter of evolutionary biology. He has simply adopted 
the creationists' definition and thereby repeated their willful 
mistake. 
Justice Scalia writes, in his key statement on scientific 
evidence: 
The people of Louisiana, including those who are Christian fundamentalists, are 
quite entitled, as a secular matter, to have whatever scientific evidence there may be 
against evolution presented in their schools. 
I simply don't see the point of this statement. Of course they 
are so entitled, and absolutely nothing prevents such a presentation, 
if evidence there be. The equal time law forces teaching of creation 
science, but nothing prevented it before, and nothing prevents it 
now. Teachers were, and still are, free to teach creation science. 
They don't because they know that it is a ruse and a sham. 
Scalia does acknowledge that the law would be unconstitu-
tional if creation science is free of evidence-as it is-and if it 
merely restates the Book of Genesis-as it does: 
Perhaps what the Louisiana Legislature has done is unconstitutional because there 
is no such evidence, and the scheme they have established will amount to no more 
than a presentation of the Book of Genesis. 
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Scalia therefore admits that the issue is not merely legal and 
does hinge on a question of scientific fact. He then buys the crea-
tionist argument and denies that we have sufficient evidence to 
render this judgment of unconstitutionality. Continuing directly 
from the last statement, he writes: 
But we cannot say that on the evidence before us .... Infinitely less can we say (or 
should we say) that the scientific evidence for evolution is so conclusive that no one 
would be gullible enough to believe that there is any real scientific evidence to the 
contrary. 
But this is exactly what I, and all scientists, do say. We are not 
blessed with absolute certainty about any fact of nature, but evolu-
tion is as well confirmed as anything we know-surely as well as 
the earth's shape and position (and we don't require equal time for 
flat earthers and those who believe that our planet resides at the 
center of the universe). We have oodles to learn about how evolu-
tion happened, but we have adequate proof that living forms are 
connected by bonds of genealogical descent. 
So I asked myself, how could Justice Scalia be so uninformed 
about the state of our basic knowledge? And then I remembered 
something peculiar that bothered me, but did not quite register, 
when I first read his dissent. I went back to his characterization of 
evolution and what did I find (repeated, by the way, more than a 
dozen times, so we know that it represents no one-time slip of his 
pen, but a consistent definition). 
Justice Scalia has defined evolution as the search for life's ori-
gin-and nothing more. He keeps speaking about "the current 
state of scientific evidence about the origin of life" when he means 
to designate evolution. He writes that "the legislature wanted to 
ensure that students would be free to decide for themselves how life 
began based upon a fair and balanced presentation of the scientific 
evidence." Never does he even hint that evolution might be the 
study of how life changes after it originates-the entire panoply of 
transformation from simple molecules to all modern, multicellular 
complexity. 
Moreover, to make matters worse, Scalia doesn't even ac-
knowledge the scientific side of the origin of life on earth. He ar-
gues that a creationist law might have a secular purpose so long as 
we can envisage a concept of creation not involving a personal God 
"who is the object of religious veneration." He then points out that 
many such concepts exist, stretching back to Aristotle's notion of 
an unmoved mover. In the oral argument before the Court, which I 
attended on December 10, 1986, Scalia pressed this point even more 
forcefully with counsel for our side. He sparred: 
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What about Aristotle's view of a first cause, an unmoved mover? Would that be a 
creationist view? I don't think Aristotle considered himself as a theologian as op-
posed to a philospher. 
In fact, he probably considered himself a scientist. ... Well, then, you could 
believe in a first cause, an unmoved mover, that may be impersonal, and has no 
obligation of obedience or veneration from men, and in fact, doesn't care what's 
happening to mankind. And believe in creation. [From the official transcript, and 
omitting the responses of our lawyer.] 
Following this theme, Scalia presents his most confused state-
ment in the written dissent: 
Creation science, its proponents insist, no more must explain whence life came than 
evolution must explain whence came the inanimate materials from which it says life 
evolved. But even if that were not so, to posit a past creator is not to posit the 
eternal and personal God who is the object of religious veneration. 
True indeed; one might be a creationist in some vernacular 
sense by maintaining a highly abstract and impersonal view of the 
creator. But Aristotle's unmoved mover is no more part of science 
than the Lord of Genesis. Science does not deal with questions of 
ultimate origins. We would object just as strongly if the Aris-
totelophiles of Delaware forced a law through the state legislature 
requiring that creation of each species ex nihilo by an unmoved 
mover be presented every time evolution is discussed in class. The 
difference is only historical circumstance, not the logic of argument. 
The unmoved mover doesn't pack much political punch; fundamen-
talism ranks among our most potent irrationalisms. 
Consider also, indeed especially, Scalia's false concept of sci-
ence. He equates creation and evolution because creationists can't 
explain life's beginning, while evolutionists can't resolve the ulti-
mate origin of the inorganic components that later aggregated to 
life. But this inability is the very heart of creationist logic and the 
central reason why their doctrine is not science, while science's in-
ability to specify the ultimate origin of matter is irrelevant because 
we are not trying to do any such thing. We know that we can't, and 
we do not even consider such a question as part of science. 
We understand Hutton's wisdom. We do not search for unat-
tainable ultimates. We define evolution, using Darwin's phrase, as 
"descent with modification" from prior living things. Our docu-
mentation of life's evolutionary tree records one of science's greatest 
triumphs, a profoundly liberating discovery on the oldest maxim 
that truth can make us free. We have made this discovery by recog-
nizing what can be answered and what must be left alone. If Justice 
Scalia heeded our definitions and our practices, he would under-
stand why creationism cannot qualify as science. He would also, by 
the way, sense the excitement of evolution and its evidence; no per-
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son of substance could be unmoved by something so interesting. 
Only Aristotle's creator may be so impassive. 
Don Quixote recognized "no limits but the sky," but became 
thereby the literary embodiment of unattainable reverie. G.K. 
Chesterton understood that any discipline must define its borders of 
fruitfulness. He spoke for painting, but you may substitute any cre-
ative enterprise: "Art is limitation: the essence of every picture is 
the frame." 
